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Abstract 
 
This paper considers the domestic and international ramifications of financialization and 
grain price instability in the US agri-food sector. It finds that during the recent period of 
high and volatile prices, the average income of large-scale farms reached the earnings 
threshold of the top percentile of US households, and agricultural commodity traders 
markedly outperformed other major corporate groups. In contrast, small-scale farms, 
particularly those involved in cattle and wheat production, have struggled to manage the 
uncertainty brought by price tumult. The paper goes on to examine the role that these 
uneven distributional dynamics play in debates around how hedging and speculation 
should be defined and regulated in the wake of the food crisis of 2007-08. It shows that 
a coalition of small-scale farmers has actively pushed for a far-reaching definition of 
speculation and concomitantly wide-ranging curbs on what they deem to be speculative 
activity. Conversely, the major commodity traders and a plurality of organizations 
representing large-scale grain producers have called for a narrower interpretation of 
speculation which leaves the extant regulatory regime largely in place. With these 
insights I suggest that financialization and associated price volatility tend to reinforce 
inequality in rural America while possibly exacerbating social instability and hardship 
abroad. 
 
 
Keywords: Financialization; derivatives regulation; food regimes; food crisis; 
commodity trading; agriculture. 
 
  
 
 Accumulating through Food Crisis? 
  
 
2 
 
 
 
‘Stability, gentlemen, is the only thing we can't deal with.’ 
 
- Chicago Board of Trade official in conversation with agribusiness executives (cited in 
Lappé, 1981) 
 
From 2007 to 2008, food prices surged. In response, people in over 25 countries 
demonstrated, rallied and rioted to express their discontent not only with the higher costs 
of living, but also injustice and inequality more broadly (Bush 2010). There was another 
bout of rapid food price inflation in 2010–11 which provoked a second round of civil 
unrest, as most clearly manifest in the Arab Spring (Bush and Martiniello 2017). 
Although food prices have since subsided, they are still well above the average level for 
the last three decades. In the meantime, many of the political uprisings of the Arab 
Spring have given way to heightened authoritarian rule or devastating civil war. 
Moreover, households across the Global South have been pushed into doing more paid 
work and consuming less nutritious food to make ends meet, with the burden of 
adjustment falling particularly heavily on women (Scott-Villiers et al. 2016).  
 Food price swings therefore matter as they can contribute to wide-ranging 
geopolitical shifts as well as profound changes in everyday life for people across the 
world. And according to many analysts, speculative activity can exacerbate such price 
swings. Amid growing international concern regarding the possibly destabilizing role of 
speculation, the US Congress conducted a series of investigations on commodity 
derivatives markets (US Senate, 2006, 2007, 2009). These studies concluded that 
‘excessive speculation’ in commodity derivatives markets – especially via commodity 
index funds (CIFs) – was indeed a key driver of high and volatile prices. Other 
derivatives markets, not directly linked to physical commodities, also aroused acute 
anxiety. In particular, many believed that the over the counter (OTC) trade in credit 
default swaps amplified the wave of defaults in the US mortgage sector into the tsunami 
of financial failure that engulfed the global economy in 2007–08. It was in this context 
that the Dodd–Frank reform agenda was conceived. Hailed as the most far-reaching 
overhaul in financial regulation since the New Deal, the 2010 Dodd–Frank Act 
mandated sweeping changes, including the imposition of new caps, known as position 
limits, on the amount of futures contracts that speculators can hold. However, despite 
the fanfare that surrounded the Act’s promulgation, the implementation of position 
limits has long passed the deadline of April 2011 set by Congress.  
 With reference to the vexed birth of the new position limit regime, this paper enquires 
into whether there are any groups that benefit from price instability within US agri-food 
supply chains, and if so, whether these groups have been resisting regulatory attempts 
at curbing potentially destabilizing speculative flows. Admittedly, a more thorough 
analysis of the evolution of commodity derivatives would offer a close examination of 
the crucial role played by corporations outside of the agri-food sector in reform debates, 
and it would also draw on the rich insights offered by those who have analyzed financial 
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regulatory policymaking dynamics in interstate and transnational policy arenas (e.g. 
Moschella 2010; Tsingou 2015). However, this paper limits its focus to the producers 
and distributors of agricultural products so as to clarify aspects of the financialization of 
agriculture that have not yet been fully explored in the existing literature. Specifically, 
the paper makes three key contributions. Firstly, it is the first explicit attempt to connect 
changes in the regulation of derivatives markets to shifts in ‘food regimes’ – the rule-
governed structures that shape the production, distribution and consumption of food 
(Friedmann and McMichael 1989). Secondly, it points to how the regulatory 
reinterpretation of hedging and speculation helped spur the financialization of 
agricultural markets, and it thus contributes to literature on the discursive reconstruction 
of the hedging-speculation dichotomy (see Engel 2013). Thirdly, it responds to recent 
calls to advance a more differentiated analysis of farmers’ interests in relation to the 
contemporary financialization of agricultural markets (Williams 2014). Although there 
has been important work done in this area by scholars analyzing the expansion of 
derivatives markets in the Global South (e.g. Breger Bush 2012; Isakson 2015; Newman 
2009), less attention has been given to the variegated impacts of price instability, and 
associated dynamics of financialization, on farmers in the Global North. 
 At a broad level, the analysis of interests in the US agri-food sector is especially 
significant because the United States can be seen as an epicenter of financialization and 
the associated price tumult that has rippled throughout the world. Indeed, the first major 
CIF – the eponymous Goldman Sachs Commodity Index – was designed by a US-
headquartered bank. The first major deregulatory measures that allowed CIFs to flourish 
were passed by US policymakers. Some of the world’s largest grain futures trading 
venues are located in the United States. And the United States dominates the export of 
the three most widely traded agricultural commodities on the planet – corn, soybeans 
and wheat – accounting for 42, 38 and 22 percent of global export tonnage of each 
respective commodity (FAOSTAT 2014). From this perspective, struggles in the field 
of US commodity derivatives regulations assume a particular importance. As I show, 
the agricultural groups that are most negatively affected by market instability – namely 
small-scale farmers, particularly those involved in cattle and wheat production – have 
promoted regulatory attempts to curb speculative activities, and have called for a broad 
regulatory interpretation of speculation and concomitantly narrow exemptions from 
position limits. In contrast, the agricultural groups that are most capable of prospering 
during instability – namely agricultural commodity traders and large-scale farmers – 
have been highly resistant to proposed curbs and have called for an expansive regulatory 
interpretation of hedging and correlatively broad exemptions from position limits. 
 The paper is divided into three sections. Section 1 draws on historical institutionalist 
scholarship to offer a power-distributional perspective on financialization and food 
regime shifts. In particular, it describes the supersession of the collective system of risk 
management set up during the New Deal era in the 1930s by private forms of risk 
management from the 1970s onward; and it highlights the ways in which the regulatory 
redefinition of hedging and speculation facilitated the growth of derivatives trading in 
agricultural markets. Section 2 illuminates the differential effects of high and volatile 
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prices that have accompanied the financialization of the US agri-food sector. Finally, 
section 3 examines agricultural interest group conflicts around the scope of new position 
limits mandated by the 2010 Dodd–Frank Act, and it draws out the international 
implications of these conflicts. 
 
 
2. A POWER-DISTRIBUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON  
FINANCIALIZATION 
 
Financialization has manifold meanings (see Clapp 2014; Isakson 2014; van der Zwan 
2014). But this paper restricts the use of the term to a particular process: the growth of 
agricultural derivatives markets relative to underlying agricultural production. Figure 1 
shows that the financialization of agricultural markets has been far from unilinear. 
Specifically, the top chart presents data on the levels and volatility of grain futures prices 
from the 1880s to the contemporary period. The bottom chart relays data on the volume 
of cereal grains produced in the United States and the volume of cereal grain contracts 
traded in futures markets. And the middle chart divides these two series to yield what 
can be called the ‘financialization ratio’. This metric reveals how many bushels of grain 
are traded on US futures markets for every physical bushel of grain produced in the 
United States. The figure clearly shows that the degree of financialization and the level 
of price volatility in agricultural markets are broadly concordant. After being at an 
elevated plane for much of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the level of 
futures trading relative to physical production declined to an almost one-to-one ratio 
from the 1940s to the 1960s, just when agricultural price volatility fell to historic lows. 
Since this period there has been a surge in the financialization of US agriculture and a 
concurrent amplification of price volatility. Indeed, in recent years, one can see that for 
every bushel of grain produced by US farmers, approximately 33 bushels of grain are 
traded on US futures exchanges; and in the last commodity price spike in 2010–11, 
volatility was at its highest point in four decades.  
 In order to make sense of the de-financialization of agricultural markets in the 1930s 
and their re-financialization from the 1960s onwards, this papers draws on the power-
distributional approach to institutional change propounded by historical institutionalist 
scholars (Mahoney and Thelen 2010). At its most fundamental level, this approach 
draws our attention to the fact that institutions are legacies of past social struggles and 
instruments of ongoing redistribution. Moreover, from the power-distributional 
perspective, institutional change occurs not only because of distributional conflicts 
around institutions’ uneven allocation of costs and benefits across groups, but also 
because institutional rules are oftentimes ambiguous and therefore open to 
contestation. To be sure, as James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen (2010: 11) argue: 
‘[c]oalitions form not only as representatives of alternative institutions but also as  
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Figure 1: Historical Dynamics of Financialization and Grain Price Instability 1884-2014 
Notes: Relative grain prices are calculated by dividing the unweighted average of the Wheat no.2 price, 
the Chicago Yellow corn no.2 price, and the soybean cash price by the Producer Price Index – All Com-
modities. Relative price data are presented as 5-year moving averages. Volatility of relative grain prices 
is the standard deviation of the monthly rate of change of the relative grain price data in a 5-year moving 
window.  
Source: Price data from Global Financial Data. Series codes for wheat prices, corn prices, soybean prices 
and Producer Price Index: W_USSD; C_US2D; SYB_TD; and WPUSAM. Volume of futures trading 
data from Hieronymous (1976: 23), CFTC (1979-2004), Burghardt and Acworth (2008: 28), Acworth 
(2011, 2014, 2015). Grain production data from Carter (2006) and USDA (2016b; 2016c).  
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movements seeking particular interpretations of the ambiguous or contested rules of a 
given institution’. As a corollary, those groups that are most equipped to foresee the 
uneven outcomes of specific institutional configurations will be best positioned to push 
for particular interpretations of rules that favor them. In contrast, those groups that are 
least equipped to foresee the distributional outcomes may not contest the interpretation 
of extant institutional rules at all. As such, the conflicts that drive institutional change 
stem both from perceptions of the uneven distributional effects of any given institution 
and the openness of institutional rules to reinterpretation (Mahoney and Thelen 2010; 
Streeck and Thelen 2005). The remainder of this section examines the distributional 
conflicts and rule interpretations that gave form to two institutional regimes governing 
the organization of cash markets and derivatives markets over the last century. The first 
is the state-managerial food regime that emerged in the 1930s, that reached the peak of 
its institutional coherence in the 1950s, and that largely disintegrated in the 1960s and 
1970s. And the second is the financialized food regime that developed around the most 
durable institutions of the previous regime, and that continues to this day. 
 
 
2.1. The state-managerial food regime 
 
Speculation in futures markets has been criticized by agricultural groups ever since the 
founding of the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) in 1848. Specifically, option contracts 
aroused disquiet for they were widely viewed as gambling devices that undermined the 
proper functioning of commodity markets. In addition, there was anxiety regarding the 
downward pressure potentially exerted on prices by speculative short-selling. These 
concerns initially led to abortive attempts by state legislatures to ban futures speculation. 
By the 1890s, in the context of a long-running depression in agricultural prices and a 
wave of populist agitation against speculators, restrictions on speculation were 
considered at the federal level. But due to insufficient congressional support and 
significant judicial opposition, no curbs on speculation were enacted in the years leading 
up to the First World War (Markham 2014).  
 However, after an upsurge in agricultural prices during the war, deflation returned 
with a vengeance and agricultural lobbying organizations professionalized their 
advocacy efforts. Farm organizations such as the National Farmers Union called for far-
reaching restrictions on speculation not only to quash short-selling activities but also to 
undermine those agricultural commodity traders that enjoyed oligopolistic control over 
Midwestern elevator operations. Through pushing for curbs on speculation, these farm 
organizations wagered that they could undermine one of the key institutions of the grain 
trade – the futures market – and in so doing, boost the control of farm cooperatives over 
the agricultural marketing system. As very few farmers used futures to hedge 
agricultural price risk, many believed they would not be negatively impacted by curbs 
to futures markets (Pashigian 1988; Romano 1997).  
 The 1929 Wall Street Crash shifted the legislative terrain in favor of farm 
organizations, as it appeared to offer legitimacy for those seeking to restrain speculators 
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in both stock markets and futures markets. Moreover, the ensuing depression in 
agricultural prices spurred the federal government into providing more substantial 
economic security for farmers in cash markets. In this context, two major legislative 
initiatives were enacted. Under the 1933 Agricultural Adjustment Act, the US 
government established a comprehensive system of price supports, production controls, 
and public grain storage known as the ‘ever normal granary’, so that farmers were 
protected from sudden income drops. And under the 1936 Commodity Exchange Act, 
the use of option contracts was banned for all market participants in registered exchanges 
and position limits on speculation were inaugurated to cap the trading of all but those 
engaging in bona fide hedging. In the terms of the power-distributional approach, then, 
the turmoil of the interwar years had heightened farmers’ and other societal groups’ 
perceptions of the uneven distributional outcomes of existing institutional arrangements 
and, in line with the resulting mobilization and institutional changes, there was a shift in 
the balance of power away from agricultural commodity traders as well as Wall Street 
banks.1  
 By the end of the Second World War, this domestic balance of power was supported 
by a complementary international environment that the US government actively 
cultivated. In particular, the Bretton Wood system of pegged exchange rates and capital 
controls helped the US government to continue to meet the demands of agricultural 
groups, among other domestic constituencies, without the risk of provoking 
destabilizing currency movements. And the exemptive status afforded to agriculture in 
the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade couched domestic supply 
management into an overarching system of managed trade. The system was based on 
intergovernmental accords such as the 1949 International Wheat Agreement and the 
1968 International Grains Arrangement, which sought to regularize agricultural prices 
and trade flows. These accords also reflected the primacy of Keynesian economic ideas 
as John Maynard Keynes himself lent his firm backing to international commodity price 
stabilization. The domestic and international arrangements that emerged as a result of 
these ideas facilitated the development of what can be called a state-managerial food 
regime. In response to the distributional conflicts accompanying the Wall Street Crash 
and the Great Depression, the distinct social purpose of this regime was to curb 
speculation, collectivize risk and stabilize prices (Newman 2009; Winders et al. 2015). 
 The changing contours of physical markets during the state-managerial food regime 
are displayed in Figure 2. The main chart tracks the amount of US wheat and corn supply 
in storage as denominated in days of overall usage, and the left insert offers information 
on the proportion of grain stocks held by the US government. The figure suggests that 
the state-managerial food regime peaked in the late 1950s and early 1960s, when US 
wheat stocks had expanded to over one year’s worth of supply, while corn stocks crept 
up to nine months of supply. Over two-thirds of the wheat stocks and almost one half of 
the corn stocks were held in government storage during these two decades (see left insert 
of Figure 2). The US government sought to relieve itself of these surpluses principally 
through a food aid program, authorized by the 1954 Public Law 480, which disbursed 
vast quantities of grain and other agricultural commodities to Third World nations at the  
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Figure 2: Historical Trends in US Grain Storage and Food Aid, 1915-2015  
Notes: Days of grain supply held in stock is calculated by the dividing end stocks by the amount of grain 
used in the marketing system each year (known as 'total disappearance') and multiplying by 365. The 
data in the charts are presented as 5-year moving averages. Food aid data do not include the aid from the 
Marshall Plan that preceded the PL 480, as no relevant information appears to be available on US food 
aid prior to 1954.   
Source: US grain stocks, government storage, export and aid data from USDA (1941; 1961; 1967; 1971; 
1976; 1981; 1986; 1991; 1996; 2016b; 2016c).  
 
frontier of the Cold War. Astonishingly, as the right insert of Figure 2 shows, from the 
late 1950s to the early 1960s, 75 percent of the US’s wheat exports came in the form of 
food aid. The system of managed trade and risk collectivization rendered the trading of 
futures contracts unnecessary for many agricultural groups that sought protection from 
tumult and unprofitable for those speculators who hankered for market swings. It is due 
to these factors that the volume of futures trading relative to underlying agricultural 
production fell to historic lows in the early post-war period. 
0
200
400
600
800
0
200
400
600
800
1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
Wheat
Corn
Percentage of stocks held by government
Wheat                        Corn
1950-69 68 45
1970-89 19 8
1990-2014 12 1
Total grain held in stock
(days of supply)
days                                                                                              
0
25
50
75
100
1950 1970 1990 2010
Food aid share of 
wheat exports
Food aid share of 
feed grain exports
percent
  
           Joseph Baines  
9 
 
2.2. The financialized food regime 
 
However, by the 1960s, the state-managerial food regime was beginning to unravel. On 
a domestic level, the broad farm coalition that originally supported the New Deal 
reforms began to fracture. In particular, agricultural interests in the South were critically 
weakened by the success of the Civil Rights movement in undermining the institutional 
basis of southern white supremacy and in broadening the franchise in African American 
communities. These historic achievements led the Democratic Party to pivot away from 
its traditional southern agrarian electoral base toward racialized constituencies that had 
been marginalized from the benefits of state-managerialism. Moreover, in the Midwest, 
large-scale farmers became increasingly frustrated with the farm program on the 
grounds that production controls represented a fetter on their income growth. Similarly, 
agribusiness interests were also becoming increasingly vocal in their opposition to the 
New Deal social compact on the grounds that they too felt hamstrung by supply 
management (Bonnen et al. 1996; Winders 2009).  
 The state-managerial food regime was weakened further by developments on an 
international level. In particular, agricultural commodity traders increasingly sought to 
circumvent the system of managed trade that prevailed in post-war agricultural markets, 
as was most clearly evidenced in a series of secretive blockbuster grain deals with the 
Soviet Union in 1972. It was in this period that the International Wheat Agreement was 
abandoned, and that the statist structures that defined the trading patterns of the early 
Cold War era began to be superseded by the eminently global interests of agri-food 
corporations (Friedmann 1993). But perhaps most importantly, the Bretton Woods 
system collapsed in 1971 following a decade and a half in which financial entities 
circumnavigated capital controls. As a consequence of the demise of the post-war 
monetary order, agricultural prices became unmoored from the fixed dollar-gold anchor, 
and administered prices were no longer considered viable at a domestic level. The US 
government’s response to these new circumstances came in the form of the landmark 
1973 Farm Bill as it initiated the dismantling of the comprehensive system of regulations 
enacted in the New Deal era (Schuh 1974). Set-aside requirements were suspended, farm 
price supports were undercut, and the US government continued its retreat from grain 
storage. Moreover, the decline of managed trade proceeded apace due to the partial and 
highly uneven liberalization of agriculture inaugurated by the Uruguay Round of Trade 
negotiations from 1986 to 1994 and the resulting WTO Agreement on Agriculture.2 The 
Agreement reinforced pressures from the World Bank and IMF structural adjustment 
programs on governments in the Global South to eliminate their grain reserves (Patel 
and McMichael 2009). Thus, having been rendered increasingly dependent on grain 
imports by vast food aid shipments from the United States in the post-war era, 
developing countries were now encouraged to dismantle their main institutional buffer 
against grain price swings, just as public grain stocks in the United States were 
themselves drawn down (see Figure 2). Due to these domestic and international shifts, 
market volatility has risen dramatically and grain exchanges experienced a massive 
increase in trading activity among those seeking protection from the price fluctuations 
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and those seeking to speculate on them (Strange 1988). The pooling of risk initiated in 
the New Deal era has thus become superseded by private forms of risk management 
mediated by derivatives markets. In consequence, a new ‘financialized food regime’ has 
emerged (Burch and Lawrence 2009).  
 The rise of this regime was also engendered by a series of incremental changes in the 
interpretation of rules that have undergirded the regulation of derivatives markets in the 
United States ever since the 1936 Commodity Exchange Act, and that have been 
replicated in other countries. Of particular interest here is the broadening regulatory 
definition of bona fide hedging as it increased the range of activities that were made 
exempt from trading caps. Figure 3 summarizes how the line between hedging and 
speculation has been redrawn by regulators since the inauguration of the position limit 
regime. As the figure shows, the first major change in the interpretation of hedging took 
place in 1956 when the USDA classified anticipatory hedging – in which a futures 
position is held in order to cover an anticipated rather than guaranteed cash market 
transaction – as a legitimate risk-reducing activity to be made exempt from speculative 
limits (Paul 1976). By no longer restricting exemptions to those entities that sought to 
offset formal merchandising commitments, this regulatory change in futures markets 
gave more leeway for commercial entities to offset the risks associated with expected, 
rather than guaranteed, transactions in physical markets. However, the regulatory 
change also gave latitude to those that wanted to engage in profitable price-bets without 
having to make prior cash commitments. The second incremental shift occurred well 
after the collapse of the state-managerial food regime, in 1977, when cross hedging – in 
which a futures position in one commodity is used to cover the risk exposure in another 
commodity – was also reclassified as bona fide hedging. Again, this provided more room 
to those commercial entities to reduce their price risks, especially if the commodity that 
they traded in cash markets did not have an equivalent in futures markets; but it also 
increased the opportunities of those that sought to bet on cross-commodity price spreads 
to evade speculative limits. Moreover, in 1982, the CFTC began a program to reverse 
the ban on options trading instituted by the 1936 Commodity Exchange Act. The 
reappraisal of what were formerly considered to be instruments of speculative gambling 
as legitimate tools for risk management indicated just how far the regulatory 
interpretation of the ambiguous dividing line between hedging and speculation had 
shifted (Berkovitz 2009; Breger Bush 2012). 
 In the context of the development of portfolio management theory from the 1970s 
onwards, hedging and speculation were further redefined. Banks began to offer swap 
contracts to clients, such as pension funds or hedge funds, seeking exposure to 
commodity price movements either to balance equity price risk or to speculate on price 
changes. The banks soon developed swaps based on commodity price indices and they 
sought to hedge their price risks arising from these OTC transactions by buying futures 
contracts on the commodity exchanges. To purchase enough futures contracts to cover 
the risks from their large-scale swap exposures, banks recognized that they needed to be 
exempted from speculative position limits. As such, they pushed the CFTC to consider 
expanding the scope of bona fide hedging exemptions. The CFTC duly obliged,  
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Figure 3: The Hedging-Speculation Continuum 
Source: Author’s own elaboration 
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Romano (1997: 285) to identify a ‘tripartite coalition of farm groups, futures exchanges 
and banks’ in the area of derivatives regulation. Farm groups’ involvement in this 
alliance is partly attributable to the fact that by the end of the twentieth century a large 
portion of US agricultural producers had become wholly incorporated into financialized 
networks of private risk management. Indeed, in a national survey of farmers in 1977, it 
was found that only 2 percent hedged using futures markets; three decades later, in 1996, 
this figure rose to as much as 25 percent (CFTC 1977; GAO 1999: 28). As derivatives 
markets had thereby become internalized in many farmers’ day-to-day operations, a 
large portion of farmers became less inclined to see the derivatives market as an external 
force used by entities, such as agricultural commodity traders, whose interests might be 
inimical to their own (Romano 1997). 
 Notwithstanding farm groups’ general assent to the rule-interpretations underlying 
the financialized food regime, the broadening of hedging exemptions and the 
consolidation of self-regulation in derivatives markets has apparently had huge 
ramifications. To be sure, according to a significant body of research, the high and 
volatile food prices in 2007-08 and then in 2010-11 were exacerbated by the influx of 
CIFs facilitated by the extant regulatory framework (e.g. Ghosh 2010; Ederer et al., 
2016). Although some scholars have rejected this view (e.g. Irwin et al. 2009; Irwin and 
Saunders 2010), as this section shows, there has been a broad long-term concordance 
between financialization and market instability. Furthermore, irrespective of the 
scholarly debates, grain market instability had a jolting impact on some farm groups’ 
perspectives on the relations between their interests and the interests of the most 
powerful actors in derivatives markets. The remainder of the paper examines this impact. 
Specifically, the next section analyzes the distributional effects of grain price instability 
within the US agri-food sector; and the final section explores how these distributional 
effects informed different agricultural groups’ advocacy efforts after the promulgation 
of the Dodd–Frank Act. 
 
 
3. THE DISTRIBUTIONAL DYNAMICS OF FOOD CRISIS 
 
In the food crisis of 2007–08, volatility had reached heights that had not been seen since 
the demise of the state-managerial food regime in the 1970s. As Clapp and Helleiner 
(2012) point out, this price tumult had significant distributional effects within the US 
agri-food sector. During the upsurge in volatility, farmers who hedged using futures had 
to pay increased margin fees in order to keep their futures positions open. Moreover, 
some grain elevators were not able to afford the increased costs entailed in offsetting 
their cash commitments to buy grain in advance from farmers. At the height of the crisis, 
they therefore stopped offering farmers forward contracts. Clapp and Helleiner (2012) 
also observe that these problems were exacerbated by the fact that, in some grain 
markets, futures prices and cash prices were not converging at the point of contract 
expiration, making it harder for farmers to plan production for the future.  
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By drawing on income data that has been largely neglected by the literature on the 
financialization of food, this section builds on Clapp and Helleiner’s insights, along with 
the work of other studies, in three main ways. First, whereas Clapp and Helleiner (2012) 
chiefly examine the distributional consequences of instability for grain farmers broadly 
conceived, this section brings animal agriculture into the analysis and offers a 
disaggregate appraisal of distributional outcomes for farmers across space, commodity 
specialization and scale. Second, provisionary remarks are also offered in regard to how 
these dynamics refract along lines of race and gender in rural America. Third, this 
section examines the income data of the major agricultural commodity traders, and in so 
doing contributes to existing analysis of the relationship between price instability and 
the trading houses’ earnings (e.g. Baines 2014; Murphy et al. 2012; Salerno 2016). 
 
 
3.1. The impacts of instability for farmers by region, and for 
agricultural commodity traders 
 
One can justifiably expect that the impacts of price instability will be uneven across 
space in rural America because one of the key features of the agricultural landscape of 
the United States is the functional differentiation of the Midwest, where grain production 
predominates, from the Southern Seaboard, where livestock production predominates 
(Hart and Mayda 1998). Indeed, the Midwest is home to the two top corn and soybean 
producing states (Iowa and Illinois) and the two top wheat producing states (Kansas and 
North Dakota). And the Southern Seaboard – the wide regional arc that extends along 
the southern and south-eastern coastline of the United States – is home to the largest 
beef producing state (Texas), the three top poultry producing states (Georgia, Arkansas 
and Alabama) and the heartland of industrialized hog production (North Carolina). In an 
initial attempt to disaggregate the distributional consequences of agricultural price 
instability, Table 1 shows the results of regressing grain price volatility and grain price 
levels against the relative farm incomes in these state-based groupings. It also offers the 
results of regressing such price data against the relative earnings of the three largest 
agricultural commodity traders in the world: Archer Daniels Midland, Bunge and 
Cargill. According to some estimates, these three companies, together with the highly 
secretive Louis Dreyfus, account for between 75 percent and 90 percent of the global 
grain trade (Lawrence 2011). 
 The relative income of the agricultural commodity traders is calculated through 
drawing on a method developed by Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler (2009) in 
which the average net income of a given group of firms is divided by the average net 
income of the top 500 firms listed in the United States, ranked by earnings. The relative 
income of farmers is calculated by dividing farmers’ average nominal income by the 
average nominal income of nonfarm workers for each quarter. The grain price data are 
deflated by the producer price index for all commodities. The table chiefly examines the 
period between the years 2000 and 2015, as the year 2000 is the earliest point in which 
data on the quarterly net income of all three commodity traders are available. While  
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Table 1: Multilinear Regression Analysis of Agricultural Income and Grain Futures Price Dy-
namics  
∗∗ and ∗ denote significance at 99% (p ≥ .01), and 95% (p > .05) levels, respectively. Standard errors in 
parentheses. 
Source: Farm proprietor and non-farm worker income data from Bureau of Economic of Analysis through 
Global Insight. Archer Daniels Midland, Bunge and Compustat 500 net income data from Compustat 
through WRDS. Cargill quarterly net income data from Factiva database and Cargill (2016). Cargill an-
nual net income data from Broehl (1992; 1998; and 2008), Kneen (1995), and Cargill (2016). 
Note: For the Midwestern farmer, Southern seaboard farmer and agricultural commodity trader datasets 
relative grain futures prices are computed by deflating the daily Commodity Research Bureau Grain Index 
by the interpolated monthly Producer Price Index (all commodities – non-seasonally adjusted). Farm net 
income data comprise only on-farm income and are restricted to sole proprietorships; they do not include 
off-farm income and the earnings of corporate farms. Price level data calculated as the average daily price 
level for each quarter. Price volatility data computed as the standard deviation of the daily changes in 
relative grain futures prices in each quarter. For the Cargill dataset, price level data are calculated as the 
average monthly price level for each year; and price volatility data computed as the standard deviation of 
the monthly changes in relative grain prices in each quarter. Colinearity checked and confirmed absent 
for regressions covering 2000-2015 and 1951-2015 periods with variance inflation factors of 1.432 and 
1.020 respectively.  
 
Louis Dreyfus is omitted from the analysis because data on its net income are only 
obtainable for the years after 2011, separate regression results for the long-term profit 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
N 
 
Relative Grain  
Futures Prices 
 
Standardized Beta 
Coefficient  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Volatility of Grain 
Futures Prices 
 
Standardized Beta 
Coefficient 
 
  
Farmer relative in-
come (Midwest) 
2000-2015 
  
 
62 
 
0.818** 
(0.001) 
 
-0.165 
(0.001) 
 
Farmer relative in-
come (Southern Sea-
board) 2000-2015   
 
62  -0.379** 
(0.001) 
  -0.365** 
(0.000) 
Agricultural commod-
ity traders relative 
profit 2000-2015  
 
Cargill relative profit 
1951-2015 
62 
 
 
 
65 
0.163 
(0.071) 
 
 
-0.008 
(0.001) 
0.323* 
(0.068) 
 
 
0.737** 
(0.011) 
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dynamics of Cargill are presented because we have earnings data for this firm going all 
the way back to the 1950s. The data show a statistically significant positive correlation 
between the levels of relative grain prices and the relative income of farmers in the 
Midwest, and no correlation of statistical significance between the volatility of relative 
grain prices and the relative income of farmers in this region. In contrast, the data reveal 
statistically significant negative correlations between relative grain price levels and 
relative grain price volatility, on the one hand, and the relative income of farmers in the 
Southern Seaboard, on the other. Furthermore, the data show a statistically significant 
positive correlation between price volatility and the relative earnings of the three largest 
commodity traders. This positive correlation is especially pronounced in the case of the 
long-term profit dynamics of Cargill from the 1950s onwards.  
 The commodity traders tend to thrive during periods of volatility due to their 
unsurpassed reach into global trade flows, their proprietary control over private grain 
storage data, and their often privileged access to policymakers and supply chain 
participants. Indeed, as they are privy to multifarious streams of commercially-relevant 
information they have a clear lead in the ‘price discovery’ process. And during periods 
of price turbulence, this lead tends to widen as the agricultural commodity traders can 
take advantage of the disorientation of other market participants. The growing 
informational asymmetries afford the commodity traders increased market power as they 
can navigate larger profit opportunities through arbitrage, speculation or the ramped up 
provision of private risk-management services to less informed actors. In fact, in 2007, 
when agricultural price volatility increased sharply, Cargill’s risk management and 
financial division accounted for an astounding 34 percent of the company’s net income 
(Bloomberg 2014). As such, the agricultural commodity traders may be among the main 
beneficiaries of the financialization of food and the coeval decline of public grain stocks 
(Murphy et al. 2012; Salerno 2016).  
 Turning to agricultural producers, it is understandable that Midwestern farmers 
benefit from high prices given the fact that, ceteris paribus, higher grain prices will lead 
to wider profit margins for grain farmers. But there is not a positive correlation between 
Midwestern farmers’ income and grain price volatility for reasons that have been well-
established by Clapp and Helleiner (2012), and that were recounted at the beginning of 
this section. However, what the existing literature tends to miss is that livestock 
producers are generally hit the hardest by high and volatile grain prices. For while grain 
price changes will move in line with the prices received for the output of many farmers 
in the Midwest, they will broadly move in sync with the input costs borne by the many 
livestock producers concentrated in the Southern Seaboard. To be sure, feed grain 
comprises 60-70 percent of livestock production costs in the United States, and thus high 
grain prices are associated with crimped margins in regions where animal agriculture 
predominates (Becker 2008). In addition, unlike grain farmers, livestock farmers cannot 
withhold their product using on-farm storage facilities in the hope of more favorable 
price conditions in the future. The marketing window for live animals is simply too short 
and the handling costs are too high. Livestock farmers thus appear particularly 
vulnerable to price fluctuations. Moreover, it is worth noting that the distributional 
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patterns outlined here are imbricated in highly racialized inequalities. According to the 
latest census data, 90 percent of black farmers operate in just six southern states, and 
Hispanic farmers are similarly concentrated in the South (USDA 2014a). Additionally, 
in terms of commodity-specialization, more than two-thirds of Native American farms 
are engaged in livestock production, compared to just half of all farms (USDA 2014b). 
By way of contrast, the farming population in the grain growing regions of the Midwest 
are overwhelmingly of northern European origin. Given these demographics, farmers of 
colour are more likely to be negatively impacted by high and volatile grain prices. 
 
 
3.2. A deeper look: the impacts of instability for farmers across 
commodity specialization and scale 
 
Figure 4 further disaggregates the picture for agricultural producers, as it presents annual 
inflation-adjusted data on farmer income patterns according to commodity-
specialization. It appears to show that among grain producers, wheat growers have the 
most volatile earnings; while among livestock producers, cattle ranchers have the most 
unstable income. These varying levels of income volatility are partly attributable to the 
specificities of different forms of agriculture. Ranchers are in a particularly precarious 
position because cattle have the longest biological cycle of all farmed animals in the 
United States. The gestation period for calves is nine months, and then cows can live for 
up to one and a half years before they are killed. In contrast, it takes just 13 weeks to 
bring chickens from zygote-state to slaughter weight, and just 45 weeks for hogs. As a 
result of the longer biological cycle of cows, it takes a longer time for cattle producers 
to adjust population levels to new feed grain price conditions, and they are thus 
particularly harmed by grain price volatility (MacDonald 2008; McBride and Matthews 
2011). In regard to crop producers, the fact that wheat growers appear to have more 
volatile earnings than corn and soybean producers is also in part attributable to the 
irreducible biophysical specificities of different forms of farming. Most importantly, in 
the Corn Belt growing conditions are highly versatile. Corn farmers can easily shift 
production to other feed grains, especially soybeans as they are a key rotation crop. In 
contrast, in the Wheat Belt, growing conditions are less propitious for crop 
diversification. Wheat growers are thus less able to switch production in the face of 
adverse price conditions (Winders 2009). 
 Figure 5 sheds light on the severity of convergence problems for corn, soybean and 
wheat markets, while also offering a more granular picture of price volatility and 
financialization. Specifically, the top chart depicts the speculation ratios for the Chicago 
Board of Trade’s soft red wheat, soybean and corn contracts. The speculation ratio is 
calculated by dividing the long positions held by commodity index traders by the short 
positions for the corresponding futures contracts held by market participants with 
positions in physical markets. Following Shanmugam and Armah (2012), we can use 
this ratio as a rough measure of the degree to which CIFs exceed the socially useful 
function of providing liquidity to entities involved in the production and trade of  
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Figure 4: Farm Income by Production Speciality, 1996-2014 
 Note: Farm income deflated by Commodity Price Index. 
 Source: Commodity Price Index from Bureau of Economic Analysis through Global Insight. Farm 
 income data from USDA (2016). 
 
physical commodities. The second chart down offers data on the ‘basis’ of wheat, soy-
beans and corn. The basis is the cash price minus the futures price for any given agri-
cultural commodity at the point of contract expiration, and thus indicates the extent to 
which cash markets and futures markets are decoupled. Finally, the bottom two charts 
of Figure 5 offer a close view of inflation-adjusted price levels and volatility in wheat, 
soybeans and corn futures in the Chicago Board of Trade. 
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Figure 5: Short-Run Dynamics in Grain Futures Markets, 2006-2015 
 Note: Basis is calculated by subtracting the futures price from the cash price of a given commodity at 
 its contract expiry date. The speculation ratio is calculated by dividing the long-positions held by 
 commodity index traders by the short-positions for the corresponding futures contracts held by 
 market participants with positions in physical markets. Futures price data pre-adjusted for inflation 
 by Global Financial Data database. The data cover the CBOT’s soft red wheat, corn and soybean 
 futures contracts. 
 Source: Basis data from Hoffman and Aulerich (2013). Data on market positions of commodity 
 index  funds, producers and merchants from CFTC (2016a). Futures price data from Global 
 Financial Data database. 
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Three major observations can be made in regard to the figure. Firstly, since its peak in 
2008–09, futures price volatility has trended downward, albeit in stuttering fashion; and 
there has been a decline in futures price levels since the end of 2012. Secondly, the wheat 
market has been beset with the most acute convergence problems with basis bottoming 
out at -US$1.90 per bushel towards the end of 2008. In contrast, non-convergence of 
cash and futures has been relatively mild in corn and soybean markets. Thirdly, of all 
the grain markets, the wheat market is the most financialized insofar as the speculation 
ratio for the soft red wheat contract in Chicago climaxed at a multiple of 1.96 of the 
short-positions of those futures market participants with exposures in physical markets. 
In contrast, at their respective peaks the speculation ratios of soybean and corn markets 
reached 1.02 and 0.96 respectively. The disproportionate degree of financialization in 
the wheat market is a result of the fact that while wheat contracts have a much larger 
dollar-weighting in commodity indexes such as the S&P GSCI than that of corn and 
soybean contracts, wheat output is much smaller than that of US corn output, and 
marginally smaller than that of soybean output (Mayhew 2012; USDA 2016b, 2016c). 
These data therefore further confirm that different forms of agriculture have become 
enveloped within the networks of finance in highly variegated ways.  
 Table 2 offers the final set of quantitative data for this section. The table presents 
information on farmer income patterns according to commodity-specialization and size. 
Large commercial farms are defined as farms with US$350,000 or more in gross cash 
receipts from farm operations and government payments, along with nonfamily farms. 
Small and mid-size family farms are defined as farms with less than US$350,000 in 
gross cash receipts and a principal operator whose primary occupation is farming. 
Interestingly, the table confirms that cattle ranching is the most precarious farming 
activity. To be sure, cattle growers register by far the lowest average income, the lowest 
average profit margins, and the highest volatility in profit margins. It also confirms that 
corn and soybean growers enjoy much steadier profit margins than wheat growers. 
Finally, the table offers highly significant data on farm income patterns across scale. For 
every commodity category, large-scale farms have higher and more stable profit margins 
than small and mid-size farms. Furthermore, the average on-farm net income of large-
scale commercial farms is US$354,541. Bearing in mind that the average off-farm net 
income of US farms is as high as US$72,665 (Hoppe 2014) and that, according to Saez 
(2015), the cut-off point for being in the top income percentile in the United States is 
$394,000, we arrive at a stunning finding: the average income of large-scale farms 
reaches the earnings threshold of the top one percent of US households. As such, large-
scale farmers are at the very top of the US’s income hierarchy.3 Asterisks are placed in 
the table beside other farm group categories that have an average income which exceeds 
the thresholds required to get into the top decile, ventile (five percent) and percentile of 
US households in terms of earnings.  
 The differences in profit margins and earnings stability across scale partly arise from 
the fact that large farms can manage the privatization of risk that has attended the rise 
of the financialized food regime more effectively than smaller operators. Indeed, large-
scale crop producers are more likely to be able to afford to invest significantly in farm  
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 Average net 
farm income 
(US$) 
2014 
Population  
 
 
2014 
Average profit 
margin  
(percent)  
1996-2014  
Volatility of 
profit margin  
 
1996-2014 
     
All US farms 45,312 2,076,273 23.2 20.9 
Large commercial*** 354,541 219,955 24.2 19.3 
Small and mid-size 15,981 631,718 18.7 38.1 
     
Wheat - all farms 45,067 25,391 26.5 53.2 
Large commercial** 157,790 6,518 28.4 50.9 
Small and mid-size 4,939 10,343 20.8 108.2 
     
Corn - all farms* 86,659 117,817 27.4 26.1 
Large commercial** 224,177 40,265 27.9 26.4 
Small and mid-size  18,273 34,878 21.7 49.3 
     
Soybean – all farms* 51,641 101,614 26.0 29.9 
Large commercial** 216,260 20,020 26.1 34.7 
Small and mid-size 20,020 38,880 21.0 68.6 
     
Cattle - all farms 28,565 730,756 18.8 119.0 
Large commercial*** 437,317 34,570 20.0 63.2 
Small and mid-size 15,106 238,766 17.5 646.3 
     
Hogs - all farms** 114,167 22,948 24.4 55.8 
Large commercial*** 334,747 7,245 25.4 56.0 
Small and mid-size 22,896 7,197 17.9 196.4 
     
Poultry - all farms*   61,434 49,623 28.6 106.0 
Large commercial*** 778,527 4,439 28.4 105.8 
Small and mid-size 31,899 24,226 23.1 473.0 
      
 
Table 2: Income and Precarity in US Agriculture 
*** Top income percentile of US households; ** Top income ventile; * Top income decile 
Notes: A farm is defined by the USDA as any place from which $1,000 or more of agricultural products 
are normally produced and sold annually. Farms are categorized in the top 1 percent, top 5 percent, and 
top 10 percent classifications if the sum of average on-farm income and the average off-farm income 
(US$72,665 (Hoppe, 2014)) exceed the thresholds computed by Saez (2015). The thresholds for the top 
income percentile, top 5 percent and top decile are US$392,000, US$165,000, and US$116,000 respec-
tively. Net farm income data for large commercial poultry farmers in 2014 is missing. As such, the 
value for 2013 is included instead. Volatility of profit margin is calculated as the standard deviation of 
the annual rate of change of profit margins.  
Source: USDA Economic Research Service Agricultural Resource Management Survey database. 
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storage facilities. This is very important in the context of the diminution of public grain 
storage programs, as it means that largescale farmers have greater capacity than small 
farms to spread sales out over the storage season and thereby avoid the risks that arise 
from selling everything at one time. It has also been found that largescale producers are 
more likely to hedge using futures, in part because many small farmers lack the 
information and technical knowhow to engage in futures market trading.4 Furthermore, 
large-scale farmers are not only better able to reduce risk, they are also better able to 
speculate profitably. Particularly revealing in this regard are the findings provided by 
Farm Futures – a magazine that regularly surveys its readership of predominantly high-
income farmers. According to one such study, it was found that ‘40% of those surveyed 
did some type of speculating with futures or options’ (Knorr 2007: 20). Finally, some 
large farmers combine their acumen in derivatives markets with their storage capacity 
in physical markets to engage in speculative hoarding: a practice in which grain is kept 
from the market in the hope of rising prices in the future, while option contracts are held 
as protection from downside risk (Pleven 2012). Thus, given their greater storage 
capacity and use of futures markets, large farmers tend to be at an advantage in the 
context of financialization and the depletion of public grain reserves.5 And again, these 
dynamics refract unevenly along lines of race as well as gender. Indeed, of all farms in 
the United States, 25 percent have gross earnings in excess of US$50,000; but only 18 
percent of Hispanic farms, 9 percent of Native American farms, and just 6 percent of 
farms whose principal operator is Black, exceed this annual sum. Similarly, only 10 
percent of farms that are principally operated by women surpass this threshold (USDA 
2014a). Given these data, it is probable that financialization and associated instability 
tend to reinforce the multifaceted asymmetries in power and income that exist within 
rural America. 
 
 
4. COALITIONAL POLITICS IN THE DODD-FRANK 
REFORM PROCESS 
 
This section analyzes the coalitional dynamics of agricultural groups around commodity 
derivatives reform. As with the previous section, Clapp and Helleiner’s analysis is 
particularly instructive as they convincingly argue that the agricultural groups that faced 
losses and acute uncertainty from the price instability of 2007–09 united with interest 
groups in other sectors affected by market tumult to actively push for wide-ranging curbs 
on speculation. Following on from these observations, Pagliari and Young (2014) 
incorporate Clapp and Helleiner’s analysis to offer an insightful macroscopic 
exploration of the plural politics of financial regulation; arguing that the mobilization of 
agricultural groups countervailed the lobbying efforts of financial firms directly targeted 
by commodity derivatives regulation. Pagliari and Young contrast these coalitional 
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politics to those in other areas such as credit derivatives regulation where no such 
countervailing mobilization was evident. In fact, in this area, major commercial entities 
formed the Coalition for Derivatives End-Users (CDEU) to amplify the influence of 
Wall Street banks (Pagliari and Young 2014).  
 Notwithstanding the strengths of these analyses, due to the times at which these 
articles were written they principally focus on agricultural interest group involvement in 
the legislative battles that culminated in the passing of the 2010 Dodd–Frank Act. 
Accordingly, this section extends the existing literature by investigating agricultural 
advocacy efforts after the passing of the Act. It does so, first, by examining the evolving 
alliances at the interface of agriculture and finance during the rulemaking period; and 
second, by exploring the conflict between these alliances around the timing and scope 
of new position limits. 
 
 
4.1. Alliance formation at the interface of agriculture and finance 
 
It has been well-established by Clapp and Helleiner (2012) that the market dislocation 
of 2007–09 led to the sudden re-politicization of commodity derivatives markets. In the 
domain of agricultural derivatives, the tacit alliance between those financial and 
corporate interests that actively pushed for self-regulation, and those farming interests 
that passively acceded to it, was in abeyance and a new, more conflictual, configuration 
of interests emerged. This configuration is displayed in Figure 6 as it maps out the nexus 
of agricultural and financial groups that lobbied over commodity derivatives regulation 
at the beginning of the rulemaking process. The figure shows that the agricultural and 
financial groups coalesced into two more or less distinct constellations. Using the terms 
of Ziegler and Woolley (2016), these constellations can be described as the ‘stability 
alliance’ and the ‘self-regulation alliance’.  
 The stability alliance largely comprises the groups that have been most harmed by 
price instability and have been least able to benefit from the privatization of risk that 
emerged with the financialized food regime. This alliance has therefore called for wide-
ranging reforms to derivatives markets. Indeed, of the agricultural advocacy 
organizations within the pro-reform Commodity Markets Oversight Coalition (CMOC), 
one-half lobby on behalf of cattle producers. The remaining agricultural organizations 
of the CMOC represent feed interests, family farmers, and ethno-cultural farmer groups 
which stand for the interests of Hispanic and African American agricultural producers 
alike. Moreover, of the three general farm organizations in CMOC, the National Farmers 
Union – the historic mouthpiece for small and middle-income farm interests, particularly 
in the wheat belt – is by far the largest. In contrast, the self-regulation alliance is 
composed of groups that have largely prospered in the financialized food regime and 
that have accordingly shared a preference for light-touch government treatment and the 
resolution of problems principally on the basis of regulatory self-rule. It includes two 
key lobbying organizations: the International Swaps and Derivatives Association 
(ISDA) and the Commodity Markets Council (CMC). The former primarily represents  
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the Wall Street banks that dominate swap dealing activities, while the latter principally 
represents commodity exchanges and the major commodity traders. Due to space 
constraints, the commercial firms operating outside of the agri-food sector are not 
included in the figure. 
 In the years that followed the global financial crisis, dynamics within agricultural 
commodity markets changed markedly. Commodity exchanges worked in consultation 
with commodity traders and farm groups to make technical alterations to corn, wheat 
and soybean contracts to combat convergence issues, and as indicated in Figure 5 these 
alterations successfully brought futures and cash markets into alignment (Hoffman and 
Aulerich 2013). Moreover, volatility in agricultural prices also declined around the same 
period, and the incomes of the groups that were worst hit by the 2007–09 spike in price 
instability – cattle producers and wheat growers – recovered significantly in the five 
years that followed (see Figure 4). In this context, arguments in favor of far-reaching 
derivatives reform appeared to no longer resonate so broadly. As Figure 7 indicates, 
these changes had a significant impact on coalitional dynamics. The diagram presents 
the nexus of agricultural and financial groups lobbying around commodity derivatives 
reform in 2016. The agricultural constellation within CMOC clearly shrank in size: in 
2010, 16 agricultural organizations were members of CMOC; but by 2016 there were 
only seven members. And while the stability alliance has waned, the self-regulation 
alliance has expanded. Most noteworthy in this regard is the enrolment of the leading 
commodity-specific interest groups in US crop agriculture, along with the standard-
bearer of large-scale farm interests – the Farm Bureau – into the CDEU. The 
participation of non-financial groups in obstructing reform has been thoroughly 
examined by Pagliari and Young (2014) in the field of credit derivatives regulation. But 
what has been missed so far is that agricultural interests have been among those that 
supported attempts to thwart swift regulatory changes in commodity derivatives reform. 
Given the nexus of interests connecting the CDEU to the CMC and ISDA, it seems that 
the ‘tripartite coalition of farm groups, futures exchanges and banks’ identified by 
Romano in the 1990s reconstituted itself during the Dodd–Frank rulemaking process. 
 
 
4.2. Rule ambiguity: the contested boundary between hedging 
 and speculation 
 
In line with the power-distributional approach, the self-regulation alliance and stability 
alliance did not emerge simply as a result of the uneven consequences of the 
financialized food regime. Rather, they took form as movements embodying different 
interpretations of the ambiguous rules governing derivatives markets. Of particular 
significance here are the definitional conflicts surrounding the regulatory delineation of 
hedging and speculation, as this delineation effectively determines the border between 
those entities that are subject to speculative position limits and those which are exempted 
from them.6 
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As the first section argued, one key driver of the financialization of grain markets was 
the broadening of US regulators’ interpretation of legitimate hedging activity from the 
1950s onwards. But, in response to the turmoil of 2007–09, some farm organizations 
called for a narrowing of hedging exemptions. For example, the National Association of 
Wheat Growers was unequivocally against the ‘swaps loophole’ that had been granted 
to CIFs in the lead-up to the price instability of 2007–09, stating bluntly that 
‘[d]iversifying risk in an investment portfolio should not pass the test for a hedge 
exemption; these exemptions should be reserved for parties who commercially produce, 
own or use wheat’ (USW 2008). Although the National Association of Wheat Growers 
eventually joined the self-regulation alliance, other farm groups have been more 
steadfast in their opposition to unfettered index fund activity. To be sure, the National 
Farmers Union – a core constituent of the stability alliance – has continued to urge the 
Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry ‘to direct CFTC to limit or end 
index fund commodity speculation’ (NFU 2013).  
 Moreover, some farm organizations have gone one step further by attributing 
speculative motives to commercial firms themselves. For example, the Ranchers-
Cattlemen Action Legal Fund – another mainstay of the stability alliance – accused the 
major beef packers, including Cargill itself, of engaging in untrammelled speculation: 
‘cattle producers, some of whom continue to rely on futures markets to offset price risk, 
are vulnerable to any market distortions caused by beef packers that may not only 
participate in the futures market as physical hedgers, but as significant speculators as 
well.’ (R-CALF 2011, my emphasis). At the beginning of the rulemaking process, CFTC 
staffers similarly suspected that self-described commercial entities may be engaging in 
speculative activity. Indeed, a report authored by a former General Counsel and a former 
Chief of Staff at the CFTC confirms that staffers within the agency have been ‘skeptical 
of the price risk management utility of many common commercial risk management 
practices, particularly those used by commodity merchandisers [i.e. the commodity 
traders]’ (Arbit et al. 2013). In order to close loopholes that might allow excessive 
speculation to take place under the guise of hedging, the CFTC proposed narrowing the 
exemptions for two longstanding risk management practices: cross-hedging and 
anticipatory hedging. As discussed in the first section, these two practices – like many 
other forms of risk management – can combine both speculative and risk-reducing 
motives, and thus defy clear classification.  
 The slated restrictions were actively opposed by a number of agricultural groups, not 
least the agricultural commodity traders themselves because of the key role that both 
cross-hedging and anticipatory hedging play in these firms’ operations. Their concern 
was clearly articulated by a representative of Cargill’s risk management division during 
a House Committee on Agriculture hearing in 2011:  
  
 While Congress made clear in its bona fide hedge definition that companies engaged 
 in the physical trade should receive an exemption for anticipatory merchandising 
 positions, the CFTC through its proposed rules would deny companies the exemption 
 and would recharacterize them as speculative. This is not only inconsistent with the 
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 law, but has the potential to have calamitous effects in the cash commodity markets. 
 (Cargill 2011)  
 
The self-regulation alliance has been bolstered by the fact that some farm groups have 
echoed these complaints. For example, early on in the rulemaking process the National 
Corn Growers Association stated that the CFTC’s proposed ‘bona fide hedge exemption 
provisions are overly restrictive and unnecessarily burdensome’ (NCGA and NGSA 
2011a). Furthermore, the National Corn Growers Association has pushed for the CFTC 
to be sent back to the drawing board and be given ‘more time to craft rules’ (NCGA and 
NGSA 2011b). Interestingly, this position contrasts sharply with that of the National 
Farmers Union (2011), which has called for ‘[s]wift action to curb or ban excessive 
speculation’. The National Corn Growers Association’s qualms about swift reform stem 
in part from concerns regarding the possible regulatory costs imposed by reduced 
exemptive relief from position limits. This perspective was well articulated in a letter to 
the CFTC in 2014 authored by the Farm Bureau: Changes in the definition [of hedging] 
itself and changes in the way it is interpreted by the CFTC would have far-reaching 
consequences for bona fide hedgers in agriculture… such action likely would lead to a 
markedly reduced ability for grain elevators, feed manufacturers, processors and other 
businesses to hedge their physical commodity risk and force grain and oilseed 
purchasers to reduce bids to farmers and limit the risk management programs that can 
be offered to farmers and ranchers. (AFBF 2014) 
 One should by no means assume that the National Corn Growers Association and the 
Farm Bureau provide an unmediated expression of the interests of farmers on the 
ground. Nonetheless, their stated views do indicate that some farm groups have become 
highly integrated in the advocacy networks that support the rule-interpretations upon 
which the financialized food regime is based. With a direct stake in the privatized 
modalities of risk management that have accompanied financialization, some of the 
more privileged segments of US agriculture appear to have little appetite for deviating 
from the policy positions expressed by powerful trading and financial interests  
 With this in mind, Figure 8 offers us more insights in regard to the direction in which 
regulatory debates have moved. The chart presents data on the levels of advocacy 
activity by CMOC, CDEU and CMC as measured by the relative proportion of 
comments submitted to the CFTC on its position limits ruling by these three 
organizations and by agricultural groups therein. One can see that at the very beginning 
of the rulemaking process, the submission of comment letters to the CFTC was fairly 
evenly balanced between CMOC, on the one hand, and the CDEU and the CMC, on the 
other. Then, for all but one year between 2011 and 2014, CDEU and its agricultural 
member organizations were the most active advocates, only then to be superseded by 
CMC. Given these changes it appears that as the regulatory process has unfolded, the 
debates surrounding reform have shifted from groups representing small-scale farmers 
to groups representing large-scale farmers, and then from farmers in general to the 
corporate and financial entities at the apex of the financialized food regime. 
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Figure 8: Advocacy Efforts during Derivatives Reform Debates 
  Note: Relative proportion of comment letters submitted to the CFTC is measured by dividing  
  the number of submissions from the CMOC, CDEU and CMC and their respective     
  agricultural members by the total number of submissions from these groups.  
  Source: Comment submissions information from CFTC (2016b).  
 
 
In further evidence that regulatory debates have become more removed from grassroots 
agricultural organizations, in June 2014 the CFTC held a roundtable with commodity 
exchanges and commodity traders to address their concerns regarding the bona fide 
hedging exemption. The danger of such meetings is that, as discussions around the 
appropriate regulatory delineation of hedging and speculation get ever more technical, 
regulators become increasingly beholden to the intricate risk management knowledge of 
those entities that it might otherwise regulate. By extension, in these complex debates, 
the stability alliance may not have the informational capacity to determine the interests 
of its own constituents, let alone represent them effectively. The possible outcome is 
that, in spite of the best efforts of some individuals in the CFTC, the regulatory landscape 
is warped in favor of incumbent leaders in derivatives markets at the expense of less-
informed and less-resourced actors. After a period of acrimony between the CFTC and 
the largest corporate users of commodity derivatives, this cognitive capture may be in 
progress. In May 2016, the CFTC succumbed to at least some of the arguments of the 
self-regulation alliance by loosening the hedging definition and by allowing commodity 
exchanges greater discretion in granting position limit exemptions (Blosfield and 
Osipovich 2016). Thus, as the rulemaking process becomes ever more complicated and 
as volatility has temporarily waned, the dynamics of commodity derivatives reform 
appear to be shifting decisively in the favor of the self-regulation alliance.  
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Bringing these points together, it becomes clear that the advocacy efforts of farm groups 
in favor of the Dodd–Frank Act were more uneven than readers of Clapp and Helleiner 
(2012) and Pagliari and Young (2014) might have thought. And these advocacy efforts 
have been less sustained than supporters of far-reaching reform might have hoped. To 
be sure, at the time of writing it was entirely appropriate for Clapp and Helleiner (2012: 
201) to tentatively venture that ‘the efforts of US agricultural groups to defend their 
interests may end up generating an outcome - less volatile global agricultural prices - 
which strengthens the food security of the world’s poor’. But the subsequent work of 
these two authors in broader fields of investigation, along with the detailed analysis here, 
attests that a more pessimistic prognosis may now be in order (see Clapp 2014; Helleiner 
2014). As this section has shown, since the rulemaking process began, both large-scale 
crop growers and agricultural commodity traders have stood in the way of swift and far-
reaching regulatory measures designed to curb price instability. Moreover, as the 
previous section showed, large-scale grain producers have generally benefited from high 
grain prices, and the commodity traders have tended to prosper amid grain price 
volatility. Conversely, it has been well-documented that high and volatile prices have 
grave impacts on those food insecure populations around the world that, after decades 
of growing import dependency and declining public grain reserves, are exposed to the 
vicissitudes of world markets (Patel and McMichael 2009; Scott-Villiers et al. 2016).  
 By way of closing the circle of this analysis, Figure 9 helps us situate the conflict 
between the stability alliance and the self-regulation alliance in an international context. 
Taking its cue from Lagi et al. (2011) who link the outbreak of social unrest to changing 
food prices, the figure connects the outbreak of social unrest to relative income and 
profitability within the US agri-food sector. More specifically, the solid line tracks the 
average net income to sales ratio of the agricultural commodity traders relative to the 
average net income to sales ratio of the top 500 largest corporations listed in the United 
States; the duplex line traces the relative income of Midwestern farmers; and finally, the 
dotted lines rising from the chart’s x-axis indicate the beginning dates of the major ‘food 
riots’ and revolts of the early twenty-first century.7 The chart shows that surges in the 
relative income of Midwestern farmers and the relative profitability of the trading houses 
have been coeval with bouts of social upheaval abroad. Indeed, it is clear that 
Midwestern farmers – with the possible exception of marginal farmers, especially in the 
Wheat Belt – generally benefited from the agricultural price spikes of 2007–08 and 
2010–11. And it is also clear that agricultural commodity traders accumulated rapidly 
during these crises. If the financialized food regime persists in its current form, it is 
highly likely that these two groups will once again be among the key winners of future 
rounds of high and volatile prices in grain markets. However, the consequences of 
ongoing financialization for societies that are existentially vulnerable to sudden food 
price rises might be dire.   
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Figure 9: The Relative Profitability of Traders and Farmers and the Incidence of Revolt  
Note: The major agricultural commodity traders comprise: Archer Daniels Midland, Bunge and Cargill. 
Differential markup is calculated by dividing the weighted average profit ratio of sales of these three 
companies by the weighted average profit ratio of sales of the Compustat 500. The Compustat 500 is the 
500 largest firms by net income ranked for each quarter. Differential markup data presented as a one-
year moving average. The dashed vertical lines correspond to the beginning dates of food riots as well 
as protests associated with the Arab Spring. Death tolls reported in parentheses.  
Source: Archer Daniels Midland, Bunge and Compustat 500 net income data from Compustat through 
WRDS. Cargill quarterly net income data from Factiva database and Cargill (2016). Revolt data from 
Lagi et al. (2011). For Midwestern farmers relative income data see Table 1.  
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5. CONCLUDING DISCUSSION 
 
This paper offers the contours of a power-distributional analysis of the financialization 
of food. While the international instability that has coincided with high and volatile food 
prices looms large in the periphery of my analytical gaze, the central focus of this 
investigation has been the domestic regulatory conflicts within the US agri-food sector. 
With this in mind, two sets of observations are worth underscoring. Firstly, the price 
dynamics in the 2000s have had highly uneven effects for agricultural producers. As a 
result, farm organizations have not formed a united front around derivatives reform. 
While small-scale farm groups, particularly cattle and wheat producers, have been 
highly vulnerable to price fluctuations and have thereby championed swift and extensive 
regulations; large-scale farm groups have generally prospered amid high and volatile 
prices and have become thoroughly integrated into the financialized food regime. 
Consequently, these large-scale farm groups have been predominantly obstructionist in 
the face of far-reaching reform. The divergent coalitional dynamics within the 
contemporary US agri-food sector contrast sharply with the broad and sustained 
agricultural mobilization against futures markets in the New Deal era. During this 
period, few farmers used futures to hedge risk, and speculation was widely considered 
to drive prices downward rather than upward. In consequence, agricultural producers of 
all varieties were more likely to view futures markets as a source of improvidence and 
immiseration rather than potential security and material gain.  
 Secondly, the historical analysis of the paper also reveals that hedging and 
speculation are not objectively classifiable. Rather, the borderline that separates hedging 
and speculation – and the concomitant boundary between those subject to position limits 
and those exempt from them – is historically mutable. In previous decades the regulatory 
definition of hedging was broadened so that it encompassed not only the potentially 
speculative activities of putatively commercial entities, but also the apparently risk-
reducing operations of nominally financial firms. After the fallout of the food and 
financial crises of 2007–08, much of the regulatory debate has revolved around the 
possible reversal of this trend. However, these debates are not occurring between equal 
interlocutors. After an initial flurry of advocacy activity from the stability alliance, the 
self-regulation alliance appears to have regained the initiative as dysfunctions in 
derivatives markets have temporarily subsided and as regulatory deliberations have 
become increasingly esoteric. If restrictions on speculation are compromised as a result, 
then during the next surge in agricultural prices speculative pressures may once again 
be a possible contributor to market turmoil and concomitant societal breakdown.  
 In terms of the broader study of financial regulatory policymaking, the analysis of 
the ambiguous borders that demarcate those targeted by regulation from those exempted 
from it opens up multiple avenues for inquiry. For example, there is ample scope for 
complementary research on how the boundaries that separate ‘proprietary trading’ from 
‘market making’ have been disputed during the implementation of the Volcker Rule. 
And parallel investigations could also be conducted on historical conflicts around the 
regulatory differentiation of ‘investment banking’ and ‘commercial banking’. Moreover, 
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definitional contests around the category of ‘swap dealer’ in derivatives regulation, and 
around the category of ‘systematically important financial institutions’ in global 
macroprudential regulation are also deserving of scholarly attention. Finally, 
investigations could be conducted on how the expansion of banks and hedge funds into 
physical commodities trading in recent years has also unsettled existing regulatory 
divisions. With these considerations in mind, this paper presents the beginnings of a 
research agenda that explores how the activities of market participants and the 
architecture of regulation are dynamically co-constituted amid ongoing definitional 
contestation and distributional conflict. Ideally, this project could help us identify the 
regulatory lacuna from which future crises may originate. But at the very least, it will 
make us more reflexive about dualities that might sometimes be taken as pre-given in 
IPE, such as speculation and hedging, and perhaps most fundamentally of all, finance 
and commerce. 
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NOTES 
 
1.  As Hansen (1991: 84) argues the US government treated agricultural commodity traders 
 with ‘antagonism and scorn’ during this period. The scorn was evidenced by the fact that, 
 under the 1933 Agricultural Adjustment Act, the price supports for farmers were to be 
 funded by a tax on grain processors. This tax provision, however, was ruled 
 unconstitutional by the Supreme Court (Winders, 2009). In another expression of 
 government hostility, just one year after the passing of the 1937 Commodity Exchange 
 Act, Cargill, one of the major agricultural commodity traders, was accused by the 
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 Secretary of Agriculture, Henry Wallace, of market manipulation in corn futures trading. 
 Cargill was subsequently banned from the Chicago Board of Trade, and it did not return 
 to the exchange for two decades (Broehl, 1992).  
2.  In clear evidence that the commodity traders were no longer just subverting US trade 
 policy, but actively setting it, the Agreement on Agriculture was originally drafted by 
 Cargill’s former vice-president, Daniel Amstutz (Winders, 2009).  
3.  The table does not  include a data breakdown of what the USDA calls ‘residence 
 farms’ – those small farms  owned by operators who are either retired or whose primary 
 occupation lies outside of farming. Additionally, it presents information on mean 
 incomes rather than median incomes due to the lack of data on the latter. But we do 
 know that in, 2014 the median income of large-scale commercial farms was US$225,463 
 (USDA, 2014c). Although this  is much lower than the mean figure because of the 
 right-skewed distribution of income, it easily surpasses the income threshold of the top 
 5 percent of US households: US$165,500 (Saez, 2015).  
4.  According to one survey, it was found that 44 percent of farmers with gross sales in 
 excess of US$500,000 hedge using futures, but just 34 percent of farmers with gross sales 
 in the range of US$100,000-$250,000 follow suit (GAO, 1999: 24).  
5.  For more evidence of the possibly speculative character of futures trading activities of 
 ‘hedgers’, see Cheng and Xiong (2014).  
6.  Other key conflicts revolved around spot and  non-spot month position limit levels, 
 along with clearing, margining and reporting  requirements.  
7.  The complex causal pathways linking high and volatile food prices to social unrest are 
 discussed by Patel and McMichael (2009) and Barrett (2013). 
 
 
NOTES ON CONTRIBUTOR 
 
Joseph Baines is a Lecturer in International Political Economy at King’s College 
London.  
 
Email: joseph.baines@kcl.ac.uk 
 
 
REFERENCES  
 
 
Acworth, W. (2011) FIA Annual Volume Survey 2010, Washington, DC: Financial Industry 
 Association Press Release. March 2011; accessed at https://secure. 
 fia.org/downloads/Volume-Mar_FI(R).pdf, 31 July 2016.  
Acworth, W. (2014) FIA Annual Volume Survey 2013, Washington, DC: Financial Industry 
 Association Press Release. March 2015; accessed at https://secure. 
 fia.org/downloads/FIA_Annual_Volume_Survey_2013.pdf, 31 July 2016.  
Acworth, W. (2015) FIA Annual Volume Survey 2014, Washington, DC: Financial Industry 
 Association Press Release. March 2015; accessed at https://fimag. fia.org/articles/2014-
  
 
 Accumulating through Food Crisis? 
  
 
34 
 
 fia-annual-global-futures-and-options-volume-gainsnorth-america-and-europe-offset, 
 31 July 2016.  
American Farm Bureau Federation (AFBF). (2014) ‘Letter to CFTC re: position limits for 
 derivatives’, Washington DC. 10 February 2014; accessed at http:// 
 comments.cftc.gov/Handlers/PdfHandler.ashx?idD25428, 31 August 2014.  
Arbit, T., Banaei, S., Loesch, M. and Sherman, J. (2013, November 8) ‘CFTC approves new 
 speculation position limits and aggregation proposals’, Norton Rose Fulbright, 8 
 November 2013; accessed at http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/knowledge/publicatio 
 ns/108040/cftc-approves-new-speculative-position-limits-aggregation-proposals, 18 
 August 2014.  
Baines, J. (2014) ‘Food price inflation as redistribution: towards a new analysis of corporate 
 power in the world food system’, New Political Economy 19(1): 79– 112.  
Barrett, C. B. (2013). Food Security and Sociopolitical Stability, Oxford: Oxford University 
 Press.  
Becker, G. S. (2008) ‘Livestock feed costs: concerns and options’, CRS Report for 
 Congress, 17 September; accessed at http://congressionalresearch.com/RS22908/ 
 document.php?studyDLivestockCFeedCCostsCConcernsCandCOptions, 21 March 
 2014.  
Berkovitz, D. M. (2009) ‘Position limits and the hedge exemption, brief legislative history’; 
 accessed at http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/ berkovitzstatement07 
 2 809, 31 July 2016.  
Bloomberg L. P. (2014) ‘Segment data for Cargill 2007-2014’; accessed 8 May 2015 from 
 Bloomberg Terminal database. Blosfield, E. and Osipovich, A. (2016) ‘CFTC moving to 
 amend position limits rule, sources say’, Risk Magazine, 17 May; accessed at 
 http://www.risk.net/energy-risk/news/2458386/cftc-moving-to-amend-position-limits-
 rule-sources-say, 31 July 2016.  
Bonnen, J. T., Browne, W. P. and Schweikhardt, D. B. (1996) ‘Further observations on the 
 changing nature of national agricultural policy decision processes, 1946-1995’, 
 Agricultural History 70(2): 130–52.  
Breger Bush, S. (2012) Derivatives and Development: A Political Economy of Global 
 Finance, Farming, and Poverty, Basingstoke: Springer.  
Broehl, W. G. (1992) Cargill:  Trading the World’s Grain, Hanover, NH: University Press 
 of New England. 
Broehl, W. G. (1998) Cargill: Going Global, Hanover, NH: University Press of New 
 England.  
Broehl, W. G. (2008) Cargill: From Commodities to Customers, Hanover, NH: University 
 Press of New England.  
Burch, D. and Lawrence, G. (2009) ‘Towards a third food regime: behind the 
 transformation’, Agriculture and Human Values 26(4): 267–79.  
Burghardt, G. and Acworth, W. (2009) FIA Annual Volume Survey 2008, Washington, DC: 
 Financial Industry Association Press Release. March 2009; accessed at 
 https://secure.fia.org/downloads/March_Volume(REV-2).pdf, 31 July 2016.  
Bush, R. (2010) ‘Food riots: poverty, power and protest’, Journal of Agrarian Change 10(1): 
 119–29.  
  
           Joseph Baines  
35 
 
Bush, R. and Martiniello, G. (2017) ‘Food riots and protest: agrarian  modernizations and 
 structural Crises’, World Development 91: 193–207.  
Cargill. (2011) ‘Testimony of Todd Thul risk manager, Cargill AgHorizons to the House 
 Committee on Agriculture’, 12 October 2011; accessed at https://agricul 
 ture.house.gov/sites/republicans.agriculture.house.gov/files/pdf/hearings/Thul111012.p
 df, 18 September 2014.  
Cargill. (2016) Financial Information; Minneapolis, MN: Cargill; accessed at http:// 
 www.cargill.com/company/financial/, 31 July 2016.  
Carter, S. B. (2006) Historical Statistics of the United States: Earliest Times to the Present, 
 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Cheng, I. W. and Xiong, W. (2014) ‘Why do  hedgers trade so much?’, Journal of Legal 
 Studies 43: 183–207.  
Clapp, J. (2014) ‘Financialization, distance and global food politics’, Journal of Peasant 
 Studies 41(5): 797–814.  
Clapp, J. and Helleiner, E. (2012) ‘Troubled futures? The global food crisis and the 
 politics of agricultural derivatives regulation’, Review of International Political 
 Economy 19(2): 181–207.  
Coalition for Derivatives End-Users. (2010) Letter to CFTC, Re: Advanced Notice of 
 Proposed Rulemaking. File no. S7-16-10, Washington, DC: CDEU; 20 September 2010; 
 accessed at http://businessroundtable.org/resources/letter-to-secretary-elizabeth-
 murphy-and-secretary-david-stawick-on-de, 31 July 2016.  
Coalition for Derivatives End-Users. (2016) Coalition Members; Washington, DC: CDEU; 
 accessed at http://coalitionforderivativesendusers.com/AboutUs/ coalition-members, 31 
 July 2016.  
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). (1977) Farmers’ Use of Futures Markets 
 and Forward Contracts – 1977 report, Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office; 
 16 March.  
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). (1979–2004) Annual Reports 1979-
 2004, Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office.  
Commodity Futures Trading  Commission (CFTC). (2016a) Disaggregated Futures and
 Options Combined Reports; Washington, DC: US Government Publishing Office; 
 accessed at http://www.cftc.gov/MarketReports/CommitmentsofTraders/HistoricalCom 
 pressed/index.htm, 31 July 2016.  
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). (2016b) Public Comments; Washington, 
 DC: US Government Publishing Office; accessed at http://com 
 ments.cftc.gov/PublicComments/CommentList.aspx, 31 July 2016.  
Commodity Markets Council (CMC). (2014) ‘Letter to the CFTC, re: position limits for 
 derivatives; aggregation of positions’, Washington, DC: CMC; 10 February 2014; 
 accessed at http://www.commoditymkts.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/CMC-
 Position-Limits-Comment-Letter-2-10-2014.pdf, 21 August 2014. 
Commodity Markets Oversight Coalition (CMOC). (2010) ‘Letter to the CFTC re: general 
 comments on implementation of title VII the Dodd-Frank act’, 1 November 2010; 
 accessed at http://www.nefiactioncenter.com/PDF/cmoc_doddfrank_gencomments 
 _2010nov01.pdf, 19 August 2014.  
  
 
 Accumulating through Food Crisis? 
  
 
36 
 
Commodity Markets Oversight Coalition (CMOC). (2015) ‘Letter to CFTC re: ‘reopening 
 of comments periods, notice of proposed rulemaking, position limits for derivatives and 
 aggregation of positions’; accessed at http://www.ieca-us.com/wp-
 content/uploads/CMOC_PosLimitsLtr_03.30.15.pdf, 31 July 2016.  
Ederer, S., Heumesser, C. and Staritz, C. (2016) ‘Financialization and commodity prices – 
 an empirical analysis for coffee, cotton, wheat and oil’, International Review of Applied 
 Economics 30(4): 462–87.  
Engel, A. (2013) ‘Futures and risk: the rise and demise of the hedger-speculator dichotomy’, 
 Socio-Economic Review 11(3): 553–76.  
Food and Agricultural Organization Statistical  Division (FAOSTAT). (2014). Trade 
 Data. FAO Statistics Division; Rome, Italy: FAO; accessed at http://faostat.fao. 
 org/site/535/DesktopDefault.aspx?PageIDD535#ancor, 31 July 2014.  
Friedmann, H. (1993) ‘The political economy of food: a global crisis’’, New Left Review 
 I(197): 29–57.  
Friedmann, H. and McMichael, P. (1989) ‘Agriculture and the state system: the rise and 
 decline of national agricultures, 1870 to the present’, Sociologia Ruralis 19(2): 93–117. 
Government Accountability Office (GAO). (1999) ‘Agriculture in transition: farmers’ use 
 of risk management strategies’; accessed at http://www.gao.gov/ products/RCED-99-90, 
 31 July 2016.  
Ghosh, J. (2010) ‘The unnatural coupling: food and global finance’, Journal of Agrarian 
 Change 10(1): 72–86.  
Hansen, J. (1991) Gaining Access: Congress and the Farm Lobby, 1919-1981, Chicago, IL: 
 University of Chicago Press.  
Hart, J. F. and Mayda, C. (1998) ‘The industrialization of livestock production in the united 
 states’, Southeastern Geographer 38(1): 58–78.  
Helleiner, E. (2014) The Status Quo Crisis: Global Financial Governance After the 2008 
 Meltdown, Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Hieronymous, T. (1976) The Economics of Futures Trading, New York, NY: Commodity 
 Research Bureau.  
Hoffman, N. and Aulerich, L. (2013) ‘USDA economic research service – FDS13L- 01’; 
 accessed at http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/fds-feed-outlook/ fds13l-01.aspx, 31 
 July 2016.  
Hoppe, R. (2014) ‘USDA economic research service – EIB132’; accessed at http:// 
 www.ers.usda.gov/publications/eib-economic-information-bulletin/eib132.aspx, 31 
 July 2016.  
International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA). (2011) List of ISDA Primary 
 Membership. Wasington, DC: ISDA; 10 February 2011; accessed at 
 http://www.isda.org/membership/list_of_primary.html, 31 July 2016.  
International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA). (2016) ISDA Members. 
 Wasington, DC: ISDA; 10 February 2011; accessed at http://www2.isda.org/ 
 membership/members-list/, 31 July 2016.  
Irwin, S. H. and Sanders, D. R. (2010) ‘The impact of index and swap funds on commodity 
 futures markets: Preliminary results’, OECD Food, Agriculture and Fisheries Papers, No. 
  
           Joseph Baines  
37 
 
 27, New York: OECD Publishing, pp. 1–30; accessed at 
 https://doi.org/10.1787/5kmd40wl1t5f-en, 31 July 2016.  
Irwin, S. H., Sanders, D. R. and Merrin, R. P. (2009) ‘Devil or angel? The role of speculation 
 in the recent commodity price boom (and bust)’, Journal of Agricultural and Applied 
 Economics 41(2): 377–91.  
Isakson, S. R. (2014) ‘Food and finance: the financial transformation of agro-food supply 
 chains’, Journal of Peasant Studies 41(5): 749–75.  
Isakson, S. R. (2015) ‘Derivatives for  development? Small-Farmer vulnerability and the 
 financialization of climate risk management’, Journal of Agrarian Change 15(4): 569–
 80.  
Kneen, B. (2002) Invisible Giant: Cargill and its Transnational Strategies, London: Pluto 
 Press.  
Knorr, B. (2007) ‘Hate speculators?’, Farm Futures March 2007: 20.  
Lagi, M., Bertrand, K.  Z. and Bar-Yam, Y. (2011) The Food Crises and Political 
 Instability in North Africa and  the Middle East, Cambridge, MA: New England 
 Complex Systems Institute. 11 August;  accessed at http://arxiv.org/pdf/ 1108.2455.pdf, 
 31 July 2016.  
Lappé, F. M. (1981) ‘Testimony on behalf of the Institute for Food and Development Policy 
 to the Subcommittee on Department Operations, Research, and Foreign Agriculture of 
 the Committee on Agriculture’, Washington, DC: House of Representatives, Ninety-
 seventh Congress, first session, US Printing Office, 28 July 1981.  
Lawrence, F. (2011) ‘The global food crisis: ABCD of food-how the multinationals 
 dominate trade’, The Guardian. 2 Jun; accessed at https://www.theguardian.com/global-
 development/poverty-matters/2011/jun/02/abcd-food-giantsdominate-trade, 31 July 
 2016.  
MacDonald, J. M. (2008) ‘The economic organization of US broiler production. USDA 
 economic research service – EIB38’; accessed at http://www.ers.usda. 
 gov/publications/eib-economicinformation-bulletin/eib38.aspx, 31 July 2016.  
Markham, J. (2014) Law Enforcement and the History of Financial Market Manipulation, 
 New York, NY: Routledge.  
Mahoney, J. and Thelen, K. (2010) ‘A theory of gradual institutional change’, in J. Mahoney 
 and K. Thelen (eds) Explaining Institutional Change Ambiguity, Agency, and Power, 
 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1–37.  
Mayhew, R. (2012) ‘Using futures & options to risk manage the increasing influence of the 
 outside markets on our commodity prices’, Presentation Oil and Fats Seminar. 22 
 November; accessed at http://www.adm.com/en-US/products/food/oils/Documents/Rich 
 ard%20Mayhew%20-%20ADM%20Investor.pdf, 31  July 2016.  
McBride, W. D. and Matthews Jr., K. (2011) ‘The diverse structure and organization of U.S. 
 Beef cow-calf farms’, Economic Research Service Economic Information System (73): 
 1–42. March 2011; accessed at http://www.ers.usda.gov/media/335292/dateliners_april2 
 011_1_.pdf, 31 July 2016.  
Moschella, M. (2010) ‘Back to the drawing board: the international financial architecture 
 exercise’, Review of International Political Economy 17(1): 155–71.  
  
 
 Accumulating through Food Crisis? 
  
 
38 
 
Murphy, S., Burch, D. and Clapp, J. (2012) ‘Cereal secrets: the world’s largest grain traders 
 and global agriculture’, Oxfam Research Reports, August 2012; accessed at 
 http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/rr-cerealsecrets-grain-traders-
 agriculture-30082012-en.pdf, 10 August 2014.  
National Corn Growers Association (NCGA) and the National Gas Suppliers Association 
 (NGSA). (2011a) ‘Letter to house committee on agriculture, re: NCGA and NGSA 
 support passage of H.R. 1573 to facilitate implementation of title VII of Dodd-Frank wall 
 street reform and consumer protection act’, 3 May 2011; accessed at 
 http://www.ncga.com/upload/files/documents/pdf/dodd.frank.ncga_ngsa_letter_support
 ing_hr1573_final_05032011.pdf, 18 August 2014.  
National Corn Growers Association (NCGA) and the National Gas Suppliers Association 
 (NGSA). (2011b) ‘Press release: natural gas companies and corn growers urge congress 
 to grant more time and proper sequencing for CFTC financial reform rules’, 3 May 2015; 
 accessed at http://www.ngsa.org/download/news/news-2011/06%20 
 %20NGSA%20and%20Corn%20Support%20Sequencing% 20Bill.pdf, 31 July 2016. 
National Farmers Union (NFU). (2011) ‘Letter to CFTC, re: position limits of derivatives; 
 proposed rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 4752’, 26 January 2011; accessed at 
 http://comments.cftc.gov/PublicComments/ViewComment.aspx?idD33951&SearchTex
 tDnational%20farmers%20union, 31 July 2016.  
National Farmers Union (NFU). (2013) ‘Letter to senate committee on agriculture, nutrition 
 and forestry, RE: reauthorization of the CFTC’, 1 May 2013; accessed at 
 http://www.agriculture.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/National%20Farmers %20Union.pdf, 
 31 July 2016.  
Newman, S. A. (2009) ‘Financialization and changes in the social relations along 
 commodity chains: the case of coffee’, Review of Radical Political Economics 41 (4): 
 539–59.  
Nitzan, J. and Bichler, S. (2009) Capital as Power: A Study of Order and Creorder, Milton 
 Park, Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge.  
Pashigian, B. P. (1988) ‘Why have some farmers opposed futures markets?’ Journal of 
 Political Economy 96(2): 371–82.  
Pagliari, S. and Young, K. L. (2014) ‘Leveraged interests: Financial industry power and the 
 role of private sector coalitions’, Review of International Political Economy 21(3): 575–
 610.  
Paul, A. (1976) ‘Treatment of hedging in commodity market regulation’, Economics 
 Research Service, United States Department of Agriculture. Technical Bulletin, No. 
 1538: 1–27.  
Patel, R. and McMichael, P. (2009) ‘A political economy of the food riot’, Review (Fernand 
 Braudel Center) 32(1): 9–35.  
Pleven, L. (2012) ‘Behind corn’s squeeze play: farmers’, Wall Street Journal. 25 November 
 2012; accessed at http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142405297020477860 
 45772 43491711608130, 31 July 2016.  
Romano, R. (1997) ‘The political dynamics of derivative securities regulation’, Yale Journal 
 of Regulation (14): 279–406.  
  
           Joseph Baines  
39 
 
Ranchers-Cattlemen Action Legal Fund, United Stockgrowers of America (RCALF). 
 (2011) ‘Letter to the CFTC Re: comments concerning position limits for derivatives: 
 notice of proposed rulemaking’, 28 March 2011; accessed at http://www.r-
 calfusa.com/Trade/110328-CommentsCFTCProposedRuleonPositionLimits.pdf, 19 
 August 2014.  
Saez, E. (2015) Striking it Richer: The Evolution of Top Incomes in the United States, 
 Berkeley, CA: University of California. Accessed at https://eml.berkeley. 
 edu/»saez/saez-UStopincomes-2013.pdf, 12 December 2015.  
Salerno, T. (2016) ‘Cargill’s corporate growth in times of crises: how agro-commodity 
 traders are increasing profits in the midst of volatility’, Agriculture and Human Values 
 34(1): 211–22.  
Schuh, G. E. (1974) ‘The exchange rate and U. S. agriculture’, American Journal of 
 Agricultural Economics 56(1): 1–13. 
Scott-Villiers, P., Chisholm, N., Wanjiku, K. and Hossain, N. (2016) ‘Precarious lives: 
 work, food and care after the global food crisis’, Oxfam Research Report. UK: Institute 
 of Development Studies, University of Sussex, pp.1–76. Accessed at http://policy-
 practice.oxfam.org.uk/publications/precarious-lives-workfood-and-care-after-the-
 global-food-crisis-620020, 20 December 2016.  
Shanmugam, V. and Armah, P. (2012) ‘Role of speculators in agricultural commodity price 
 spikes during 2006-2011’, Academy of Accounting and Financial Studies Journal 16: 
 97–114.  
Strange, S. (1988). States and Markets, London: Pinter. Streeck, W. and Thelen, K. (2005) 
 ‘Introduction: institutional change in advanced political economies’, in W. Streeck and 
 K. Thelen (eds) Beyond Continuity: Institutional Change in Advanced Political 
 Economies, Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Tsingou, E. (2015) ‘Transnational veto players and the practice of financial reform’, British 
 Journal of Politics & International Relations 17(2): 318–34.  
United States Department of  Agriculture (USDA). (1941–1996) Agricultural Statistics, 
 Washington, DC: Department  of Agriculture.  
United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). (2014a) 2012 Census  of Agriculture, 
 US and State Data. Washington, DC: Department of Agriculture.  Accessed at 
 https://www.agcensus.usda.gov/Publications/2012/Full_Report/Volume_1,_Chapter_1_
 US/usv1.pdf  
United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). (2014b) American Indian Farmers, US 
 Census Highlights. Washington, DC: Department of Agriculture. Accessed at 
 https://www.agcensus.usda.gov/Publications/2012/Online_Resources/Highlights/Ameri
 can_Indian_Farmers/Highlights_American_In dian_Farmers.pdf, 31 July 2016.  
United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). (2014c) Agricultural Resource 
 Management Survey. Washington, DC: Department of Agriculture. Accessed at 
 www.ers.usda.gov/datafiles/Farm_Household_Income/table02.xls, 31 July 2016.  
United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). (2016a) Agricultural Resource 
 Management Survey Database, Washington, DC: US Publishing Office. Accessed at 
 http://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/arms-farm-financialand-crop-production-
 practices/arms-data.aspx, 31 July 2016. United States Department of Agriculture 
  
 
 Accumulating through Food Crisis? 
  
 
40 
 
(USDA). (2016b) Feed Grains Database., Washington DC: US Publishing Office. Accessed 
 at http://www.ers.usda. gov/data-products/wheat-data.aspx#25377, 31 July 2016. United 
 States Department of Agriculture (USDA). (2016c) Wheat Data., Washington, DC: US 
 Publishing Office. Accessed at http://www.ers.usda.gov/dataproducts/wheat-
 data.aspx#25377, 31 July 2016.  
United States Senate. (2006) The Role of Market Speculation in Rising Oil and Gas Prices: 
 a Need to Put the Cop Back on the Beat, Staff Report, Permanent Subcommittee on 
 Investigations, Washington, DC: U.S. Senate, S. Prt. No. 109-65, 27 June.  
United States Senate. (2007) Excessive Speculation in the Natural Gas Market, Staff Report, 
 Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate Committee on Homeland 
 Security and Governmental Affairs, Washington, DC: U.S. Senate, 25 June.  
United States Senate. (2009) Excessive Speculation in the Wheat Market, Majority and 
 Minority Staff Report, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Washington, DC: US 
 Senate, 24 June. 
US Wheat Associates (USW). (2008) Wheat Letter. Washington DC: USW, 2 October; 
 accessed:jhttp://www.uswheat.org/wheatLetter/doc/384579D8AD24670D85257C1500
 61C68E?OpenDocument, 31 July 2016.  
Van der Zwan, N. (2014) ‘Making sense of financialization’, Socio-Economic Review 
 12(1): 99–129.  
Williams, J. W. (2014) ‘Feeding finance: a critical account of the shifting relationships 
 between finance, food and farming’, Economy and Society 43(3): 401–31.  
Winders, B. (2009) The Politics of Food Supply: US Agricultural Policy in the World 
 Economy, New Haven: Yale University Press.  
Winders, B., Heslin, A., Ross, G., Weksler, H. and Berry, S. (2015) ‘Life after the regime: 
 market instability with the fall of the US food regime’, Agriculture and Human Values 
 33(1): 73–88.  
Ziegler, J. N. and Woolley, J. T. (2016) ‘After Dodd-Frank ideas and the post-enactment 
 politics of financial reform in the United States’, Politics & Society 44(2): 249–80. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
